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ANALYSIS
Russia between Diplomacy and Military Intervention: The Syrian Conflict 
through Russian Eyes revisited
Philipp Casula, Zurich
Abstract
As the Syrian Civil War continues to rage relentlessly, the Russian position seems unchanged. While the 
Kremlin supports the regime in Damascus, Russian media continue to portray the conflict as a legitimate 
government’s struggle against terrorism. This paper analyzes the coverage in Russian media outlets and dis-
cusses the Russian diplomatic efforts, which have unfolded particularly since mid-2014. It argues that, at 
least for the time being, the Russian military intervention complements rather than contradicts Russian dip-
lomatic efforts. While criticized by the West over its role in Syria, Russia has at least contributed to bring-
ing a variety of actors around one negotiating table in Vienna in late October 2015.
Since its start in March 2011, the Syrian civil war has claimed over 250,000 lives and left over one million 
injured. According to UN figures,1 7.6 million Syrians 
are internally displaced, and over four million have left 
the country, heading especially to neighboring countries 
but also to Europe. Syria itself, including historic cit-
ies and sites, is devastated. From the start, Russia sided 
with the regime, endorsing Damascus’ narrative of a war 
against terrorism. Over the past years, the Russian inter-
pretation of the conflict, as well as its pro-regime posture, 
has seemingly remained unchanged. However, in 2015 
Russia has embarked on a remarkable spate of diplomatic 
activity, triggered or reinforced mainly by two factors: 
first, the spectacular rise of ISIS and the increasingly 
difficult situation of the regime on the ground; second, 
by the nuclear agreement reached between the interna-
tional community and Iran. Also, the large-scale arrival 
of Syrian refugees in Europe, softened the latter’s diplo-
matic position. Finally, in a dramatic move, Russia dis-
patched military aircraft to Syria and became an active 
warring party. This is post-Soviet Russia’s first military 
intervention beyond its neighborhood. This paper will 
answer two questions: 1) to which extent did the percep-
tion of the conflict in Russia change? 2) What impact 
has Russian diplomacy had and how does it relate to the 
Kremlin’s decision to intervene militarily?
Russia’s View on Syria: the Media Front
Compared to our analysis in this publication in 2013,2 
the Russian media’s attention to the Syrian war has pro-
gressively dwindled, only to experience a sudden surge 
after Russia sent its military into Syria. Between 2013 
and 2015, no major reports by embedded journalists, 
like those by Anastasiya Popova or Yevgeny Poddubny 
1 <http://www.unhcr.org/559d67d46.html>.
2 Philipp Casula, “Civil War, Revolution or Counter-Insurgency? 
The Syrian Conflict through Russian Eyes”, in Russian Analytical 
Digest 128 (2013): 4–7, <http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/
DetailansichtPubDB_EN?rec_id=2561>.
in 2012, have been aired on Russian mainstream chan-
nels. Coverage has widely remained focused on the mili-
tary ups and downs or on missions of the Russian Emer-
gency Ministry, which has regularly flown supplies to 
Syria and evacuated Russian citizens and families from 
Syria. A Vesti.ru special section on Syria perfectly reflects 
this trend.3 Other foreign policy topics have dominated 
the airwaves instead, especially the conflict in Ukraine. 
During the past two years, only special interest outlets 
have provided continuous coverage of the conflict, such 
as ANNA-News. More political assessments were pro-
vided by newspapers or by such publications such as Azia 
i Afrika Segodnia, a monthly published by the Russian 
Academy of Sciences since the late 1950s. The journal 
mirrors the general Russian skepticism regarding the 
Arab Spring. Nailya Fakhrutdinova, for example, con-
tends in No. 5/2013 that the revolutions in the Middle 
East have not yielded the expected results. She claims 
that “the Arabs time and again return to the Islamic ide-
ology”, because of a general lack of guiding ideas in the 
region. The failure of the Arab Spring, she argues, is the 
result of “the Arab folly and of Western state terrorism”, 
since the Arabs under their previous leaders actually had 
few things to complain about, citing the Libyan health-
care system under Gaddafi as an example. Such undif-
ferentiated assessments about the “nature of Arabs” are, 
however, rather the exception. In a seven page-long con-
tribution to No. 6/2015, Maria Kholdynskaia-Golenish-
cheva, spokeswomen of the Russian permanent repre-
sentation at the UN in Geneva, describes in detail the 
development of the international context to the Syrian 
crisis. Avoiding the incendiary language of Fakhrutdi-
nova, she blames especially Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia 
and the West for supporting opposition organizations, 
which have only a slim social basis in Syria itself, while 
3 Tema: Konflikt v Sirii, <http://www.vesti.ru/theme.html?tid= 
95994>.
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disregarding the regime’s internal opponents.4 Finally, 
even the late Yevgenii Primakov, Russia’s most renowned 
Middle East expert, directly blames U.S. policies for the 
rise of the so-called Islamic State. In No. 7/2015, he 
highlights the danger that ISIS poses to Central Asia 
and to Russia itself. ISIS perfectly fits both the Syrian 
regime’s, as well as the Kremlin’s, narrative that the bulk 
of the opposition consists of terrorist groups. All of these 
reports share a deep-seated distrust of the West and of 
the revolutions of the Arab Spring.
The recent spike in Russian diplomatic and, now, 
military activity has triggered more and more reports 
in Russian mainstream media. Russian policy-makers 
badly need this surge in reporting, because Russians 
have mostly not displayed any interest in the Syrian civil 
war, and widely opposed a Russian military interven-
tion.5 Hence, state media has started to report again in 
more detail on the war6, and public opinion is beginning 
to change.7 For instance, the infamous Dmitry Kiselev 
opened one edition of his Vesti Nedeli (September 20) 
with a report on “We do not give up on Syria” (Siriu 
ne sdaiom). Kiselev argued that the U.S. “stand on one 
frontline with the terrorist caliphate” and “together they 
try to destroy Syria as a secular state”. The weekly pro-
gram also marked the return of above-mentioned Yevg-
eny Poddubny to Syria, reporting from the surround-
ings of Palmyra and Harasta, and of Anastasiya Popova 
reporting on threats to the “Christian civilization” in 
Syria. Both Poddubny and Kiselev resume the grand nar-
rative of the Syrian state’s fight against “terrorists” and 
“radicals”, highlighting the presence of Russian citizens 
in the ranks of ISIS and underscoring that giving up 
Russia’s “staunch ally” Syria would be equivalent with 
“inviting the terrorists” over to Russia. Russian TV fea-
tures the conflict with often overzealous reports,8 stress-
4 Namely the National Coordination Committee for Democratic 
Change (NCCDC). The NCCDC, however, does not receive any 
critical treatment by Kholdynskaia-Golenishcheva. Especially, 
she avoids the thorny question to which extent this opposition 
is linked to the regime.
5 Voina v sirii: vnimanie, otsenki, IGIL, <http://www.levada.
ru/28-09-2015/voina-v-sirii-vnimanie-otsenki-igil>.
6 Russia launches media offensive on Syria bombing, <http://www.
bbc.com/news/world-europe-34411653> and Air strikes on the 
airwaves, <http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/listening 
post/2015/10/air-strikes-airwaves-151012151620777.html>.
7 <http://www.levada.ru/2015/10/19/simpatii-rossiyan-na-sto 
rone-asada/>; see also “Russian Attitudes on Russia’s Interven-
tion in Syria”, in Russian Analytical Digest 173 (2015): 13–16 
(Levada opinion polls conducted on 2–5 October 2015, with 
diagrams), <http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/Detailansicht 
PubDB_EN?rec_id=3386> and the opinion polls on pp. 11–20 
of this issue.
8 Russian TV: Good weather for bombing in Syria, <http://www.
dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2015/Oct-06/317816-rus 
ing the professionalism of the Russian servicemen and 
the top-notch technology of Russian weapons. Critical 
assessments of the Russian involvement can be found in 
quality newspapers, such as Vedomosti or Novaia Gazeta. 
In the latter, the renowned Yulia Latynina complains 
that Syria “is not our land, not our war, not our terri-
tory, not our rules”,9 while in the former, Grigorii Yudin 
highlights the legality but the non-legitimacy of the Syr-
ian regime. Denis Volkov shows that whenever “terror-
ism” enters the political scene it freezes elite competi-
tion.10 Finally, Gazeta.ru also provides quality analysis, 
highlighting that there are at least five separate conflicts 
going on in Syria today, which are lumped together in 
the formula of a “war against terrorism”.11
What is most appalling about the mainstream-
assessments of the Syrian crisis is the sharp criticism of 
the West and the deep, fervent distrust of the United 
States. While there can be no doubt that Western pol-
icies have been erratic and inconsistent, claiming an 
alliance between the U.S. and ISIS seems far-fetched. 
However, this rhetoric bears witness that, for Russia, the 
Syrian conflict is more than a regional crisis. It is also 
a question of foreign policy principles, of Russia’s status 
in the world, its identity as major world power, and of 
the relations between the West and Russia. More spe-
cifically, the Kremlin dismisses any foreign interference 
into other states’ internal affairs, rejects regime change, 
while it is indifferent as to whether a regime is demo-
cratic or not. Concerning Syria, this position completely 
ignores legitimate demands raised by the opposition in 
March 2011 and the violent repression of these protests, 
it also disregards that the current regime has lost much 
if not all of its legitimacy. But if the Western tack on 
the crisis has been such a failure in Russian eyes, what 
has Russia accomplished?
The Diplomatic Front: Teaching a Lesson to 
the West or Failure of an Initiative?
What most Russian observers share is the conviction 
that Russia has a special role to play in Syria, both on 
historical and on contemporary grounds. They argue 
that Russia has special access to both the government 
and to its rivals. Since the outbreak of the Syrian Civil 
War, Russia has consistently supplied diplomatic cover 
sian-tv-good-weather-for-bombing-in-syria.ashx>.
9 Nas kinut' vse, <http://www.novayagazeta.ru/columns/70196.
html>.
10 Asad zakonnii, no nelegitimnii, <http://www.vedomosti.ru/opin 
ion/articles/2015/10/05/611387-vlast-pravo-dorogu-tiranii>; 
Rossiia pomeshala zapadnoi koalicii, <http://www.vedomosti.ru/
politics/articles/2015/10/05/611517-rossiya-pomeshala-koalitsii>.
11 Bombit' bez kontsa nevozmozhno, <http://www.gazeta.ru/
politics/2015/10/09_a_7812335.shtml>.
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for the regime in Damascus.12 However, since mid-2014, 
the Russian diplomatic efforts have gradually moved 
well beyond that and the Kremlin has assumed a more 
active diplomatic stance. Foreign minister Sergey Lav-
rov has repeatedly condemned the instability that the 
West has created in Iraq and Libya. The U.S., he added, 
“need to be trained that affairs can only be conducted 
on the basis of equality of rights, balance of interests, 
and mutual respect”.13 Russia sees in Syria the chance 
to set an alternative example on how to handle conflicts 
in the Middle East, and in doing so to restore the inter-
national prestige it has lost due to the Ukrainian crisis.
Russia’s diplomatic efforts followed a  formal and 
a non-formal track, each pursuing another aim. On 
the informal diplomatic track, Russian diplomacy pur-
sued the goal of uniting the opposition and bringing 
it to one table with the regime. Moscow hosted three 
rounds of consultative talks with various opposition 
groups and the regime, in January, April and August 
2015. These talks were conducted by the head of the 
Institute of Oriental Studies of the Academy of Sci-
ences, Vitaly Naumkin, resulting in the “Moscow plat-
form provisions”.14 These provisions call among others 
for a settlement of the Syrian crisis by political means 
on the basis of the “Geneva communiqué” of June 2012, 
for the fight against terrorism, the preservation of Syr-
ian statehood, reconciliation, and inter-Syrian national 
dialogue without any external interference. According 
to these principles, however, the issue of regime tran-
sition and democratic reforms is completely set aside. 
There is also no mention of the crimes perpetrated by 
the regime and how to handle them. This can hardly 
be a satisfying basis for broad sections of the opposition. 
Indeed, some regime opponents have boycotted some 
of the discussion rounds, which have been repeatedly 
accused of including only those parts of the opposition 
that are also accepted by the regime.
On the formal diplomatic track, Moscow’s second 
aim is to form a broad “antiterrorism coalition” against 
ISIS. Deputy foreign minister Mikhail Bogdanov, the 
Kremlin’s special envoy to the Middle East, has been 
instrumental to this aim. Increasingly, however, it has 
also been Sergey Lavrov and Vladimir Putin who have 
participated in these negotiations efforts. Especially 
since June 2015, Moscow hosted top politicians from 
all over the Arab world or sent its diplomats to the Mid-
12 Since 2011, Russia (together with China) has vetoed four draft 
resolutions against Syria in the UN Security Council. Security 
Council—Veto List, <http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/resguide/
scact_veto_table_en.htm>.
13 <http://archive.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/newsline/02EBC66354EF10
E544257B0E0045AD41>.
14 Moscow Platform Provisions, 15.04.2015, <http://geneva.mid.ru/>.
dle East. On August 3, Lavrov met with his Qatari and 
U.S. counterparts, as well as with the former Chairman 
of the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and 
Opposition Forces (National Coalition), Ahmed Moaz 
al-Khatib, in Doha. Lavrov held conversations with the 
Kuwaiti and UAE foreign ministers (August 10), and 
met at least twice with his Saudi counterpart, Adel al-
Jubeir,15 since August 2015. Lavrov held talks with the 
Head of the National Coalition, Khalid Hodja, with 
Haytham Manna, former coordinator of Syria’s National 
Coordination Committee, and repeatedly with Iranian 
foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif (August 13, 
14, and 17).
Vladimir Putin discussed the conflict with the 
Egyptian President (August 26), with the King of Jor-
dan, with the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi (August 25), 
with the Turkish president (September 23), with the 
Saudi Defense Minister (October 11), with the Crown 
Prince of Abu Dhabi (October 11), as well as with Israeli 
prime minister, Benyamin Netnayau (September 21), 
who came to Moscow with top intelligence and mili-
tary representatives. Finally, Vladimir Putin astounded 
everybody by welcoming Bashar al-Assad to Moscow on 
October 20. While Russian foreign policymakers have 
repeatedly claimed that Moscow does not cling to Assad 
personally,16 this visit demonstrated that the Kremlin 
recognized the current Syrian president as legitimate 
leader and legitimate negotiating partner. Putin later 
briefed the kings of Saudi Arabia and Jordan, as well 
as the presidents of Egypt and Turkey by phone on the 
talks he held with Assad.
Thanks to Russian mediation, there also was an enig-
matic meeting between Syrian security chief Ali Mam-
louk and Saudi politicians in early August in Jeddah: 
they met for the first time in four years in the pres-
ence of Russian representatives. However, this meeting 
remained inconclusive.17 Finally, while diplomats went 
in and out of Moscow, there was another guest, who 
arrived at the end of July: the visit of Qasem Soleimani, 
general of the Iranian Al-Quds Force, suggesting that 
Moscow was gauging its military options in advance, 
just in case of a failure of diplomacy.
15 Conflit en Syrie: Moscou et Riyad affichent leurs fortes diver-
gences, <http://www.lorientlejour.com/article/938664/conflit-en-
syrie-moscou-et-riyad-affichent-leurs-fortes-divergences.html>.
16 <http://news.yahoo.com/syria-opposition-says-russia-not-cling 
ing-assad-112738882.html>.
17 The Saudis demanded that all foreign fighters leave Syria, includ-
ing those of Hezbollah, in exchange for halting support for the 
opposition, cf. L’Arabie saoudite et la Syrie auraient repris contact 
grâce à Moscou, <http://www.rfi.fr/moyen-orient/20150804-ara 
bie-saoudite-syrie-rencontre-riyad-contact-russie-mamlouk-ben-
salman>; see also: <http://www.newsru.co.il/mideast/07aug2015/
saud8022.html>.
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The most remarkable meetings, however, took place 
in Vienna. The negotiations on October 23 gathered 
the Saudi, Turkish, U.S. and Russian foreign ministers. 
A week later, on October 30, delegations from 17 coun-
tries arrived in Austria, including Egyptian and Iranian 
delegations. To have Iran and Egypt at the negotiating 
table was an important demand of Russian diplomacy. 
With Saudi Arabia and Iran at one table, eventually, the 
two key contenders in Syria’s proxy war finally can talk 
face-to-face. Only weeks earlier, the Saudi foreign min-
ister had underscored that Iran was “the last country to 
talk to” on Syria. Finally, in the third round of talks in 
Vienna on November 14, spurred by the Paris terrorist 
attacks, negotiators agreed on an 18-month transition 
plan to establish a new Syrian government. This plan 
echoes an earlier Russian proposal for a reform process 
that would pave the way for presidential elections.
All in all, Russian diplomatic efforts yielded few tan-
gible results, and mainly confirmed the divide between 
Moscow and Iran on the one hand, and Turkey and the 
Gulf States on the other: while all sides recognize the 
threat posed by ISIS, Russia and Iran want to postpone 
the issue of regime transition until ISIS is defeated or, 
at least, until the country is stabilized again. However, 
neither the Western-backed Syrian opposition, nor key 
regional players, can accept a deal under which Assad 
stays in power. While the Kremlin wants to include the 
regime in the fight against terrorism, the Gulf states and, 
to a lesser extent, the West cannot accept its involvement 
during a  transition.18 Saudi Arabia, in particular, has 
rejected all of Moscow’s overtures so far. Prospects of forg-
ing an anti-ISIS alliance that unites Syria’s regional neigh-
bors seemed unlikely until Russia stepped-in militarily.
Russia’s Military Power Play
Russia’s recent military build-up in Syria must be seen 
against this diplomatic backdrop. On the one hand, it 
complements the diplomatic effort and has contributed 
to a further acceleration in diplomatic activity. First, it 
has led to the emergence of a de-facto alliance against 
ISIS: Russia established communication on military 
operations at least with the U.S., with Israel, Iraq, Jor-
dan and, most recently, with France. Second, Russia has 
asserted itself as key player in the conflict. Western lead-
ers are eager to talk to the Kremlin on Syria and have 
even started conceding that the current regime has a role 
to play in any negotiations. Finally, whatever the out-
come of the war, Russia will be part of the deal and have 
18 John Kerry, Philip Hammond, Angela Merkel and Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan are the latest additions to the list of formerly staunch 
anti-Assad politicians, who at least seem willing to talk to the 
Damascus regime again.
boots on the ground in the strategic coastal provinces of 
Syria. On the other hand, the military activity hints at 
Moscow’s diplomatic failure, so far. The clear drawback 
of having Russian soldiers in Syria is that they jeopar-
dize Russia’s position as a neutral mediator in the con-
flict. Despite Moscow’s long support for Damascus, it 
also tried hard to present itself as an equidistant player 
that can talk on an equal footing to all sides. With Rus-
sia becoming a warring party, this position can hardly 
be upheld. However, Russia’s influence on the regime 
has increased even further, and its position vis-a-vis Iran 
in Syria is strengthened. Damascus will rely even more 
on Russian support and will become more receptive to 
diplomatic pressure from Moscow.
Conclusions: A Common Enemy is Not 
Enough?
Russian perceptions on the Syrian civil have remained 
largely consistent. They portray it as a fight against ter-
rorism and highlight the negative influence of the West 
in the Middle East, the latter being a perspective with 
a long tradition since Soviet times. Media reports show 
that for Russia, the conflict in Syria is not only about 
Syria itself, but that it is about Russia’s standing in the 
world, about its identity as global player. Syria is also 
a field on which Russia’s relations with the West can 
be shaped. The aim of Russia’s diplomatic effort has 
been to unite the Syrian opposition, the West, and the 
regime in the fight against ISIS. To attain this goal, it 
repeated the mantra of the fight against terrorism, in 
an attempt to split the political space into pro-ISIS and 
anti-ISIS camps. “Terrorism” is an ideal catchword for 
establishing such a division. However, this approach 
disregards that the Syrian regime itself cannot be put 
unequivocally in one or the other group: regime and 
the state19, as well as regime and terrorism are not dis-
connected in the Syrian civil war. These tight connec-
tions are one reason why this operation, pursued both 
diplomatically and now militarily, has failed so far. It 
disregards the variety of demands coming from differ-
ent camps inside and outside Syria, from Syrian soci-
ety and from various military and non-military players. 
Finally, the approach has met stern resistance from Saudi 
Arabia, for now. However, it might turn into a self-ful-
filling prophecy: on the one hand, facing Russian air-
strikes, many opposition groups might unite under the 
auspices of stronger, more radical factions, and Syria’s 
National Coalition has already said it would boycott 
talks proposed by the UN because of Russia’s interven-
19 Khedder Khaddour, Shielded by the State: Assad’s monopoly 
over Syria’s public institutions, <http://carnegieendowment.org/
syriaincrisis/?fa=61027>
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tion. On the other hand, assured by Russian air power, 
the regime, too, might become more unyielding than 
it was before. Vitaly Naumkin has already complained 
about “Assad’s intransigence on issues related to negotia-
tions with the opposition”.20 However, the military effort 
in Syria seems, at first sight, to complement the diplo-
matic effort and to forge a de-facto alliance against ISIS. 
The Paris bombings pushed France to coordinate its cam-
paign with Russia. Still, as long as Russia not only targets 
ISIS, but everyone who threatens the Damascus–Homs–
Hama–Aleppo corridor and the Syrian coast, this de-
facto coalition will remain unstable. Against the back-
drop of the results of the Western bombing campaign in 
Syria and given Russia’s own experience in Afghanistan, 
the Kremlin knows well that this war cannot be won by 
military force, especially not by air strikes, alone. It also 
knows well that for the foreseeable future there will be 
no united Syria. Syria is already partitioned. Russia is 
merely deepening this partition.
Finally, while Russia has contradicted its own mantra 
of opposing foreign military interventions, it returned 
onto the international stage as a country which strives 
to be more than a “regional power”: it seeks interna-
tional influence and recognition. The intervention in 
Syria has also had a powerful effect on Russia’s domestic 
audience, since the Kremlin had promised such a return 
to world power status. Other promises of the regime 
did not materialize, like modernization or well-being, 
but this one demand seems have been fulfilled, and it 
might boost the current Russian regime’s position. The 
portrayal of the events in Syria also distracts from the 
events in Ukraine while, at the same time, they echo the 
perception of the conflict there. State media stress the 
malicious influence of the West, revolutionary regime 
change, and the following descent into chaos. Russia’s 
stance on Ukraine and its stance on Syria reflect and 
reinforce each other. Additionally, the Kremlin sends 
a mixed message to its own Muslim population: on the 
one hand, Moscow recently opened one of the biggest 
mosques in Europe, signaling that Islam is part of Rus-
sian tradition; on the other hand, it retains the author-
ity to determine what constitutes legitimate faith and 
what it considers radical faith, both at home and abroad. 
Vitaly Naumkin explicitly mentions that Muslims have 
been “brainwashed” or “duped” by terrorists. Naum-
kin claims that what Russia is doing in Syria “serves the 
interests of the whole Islamic World”.
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